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Abstract
This paper defends the use of quasi-experiments for causal estimation in economics
against the widespread objection that quasi-experimental estimates lack external validity.
The defence is that quasi-experimental replication of estimates can yield defeasible
evidence for external validity. The paper then develops a different objection. The stable
unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), on which quasi-experiments rely, is argued to
be implausible due to the influence of social interaction effects on economic outcomes. A
more plausible stable marginal unit treatment value assumption (SMUTVA) is proposed,
but it is demonstrated to severely limit the usefulness of quasi-experiments for economic
policy evaluation.
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1 Introduction
The estimation of causal effects is at the heart of any economic evaluation of policy. Although
the evaluation of any policy is ultimately a normative question, evaluations will normally
depend on which consequences a policy is thought to have.
For example, the public debate around minimum wages is often dominated by controversy
about the causal effect of increases in the minimum wage on employment. Traditionally,
economists have argued that increases of the minimum wage above the equilibrium level will
lead to reductions in employment.1 This purported causal effect of minimum wages has long
been a staple argument of those objecting to minimum wage increases. However, empirical
studies have not been able to unequivocally confirm such a negative employment effect.2 If, in
fact, this negative employment effect did not exist, this would weaken the case against
minimum wage increases, potentially leading current opponents of such increases to
reconsider their position.
The estimation of causal effects is therefore of particular significance to empirical
economics and economic policy evaluation. Over the last two decades, the traditional
approach to such estimations — theory-based causal modelling — has been challenged by the
so-called quasi-experimental approach. Its proponents, namely Joshua Angrist, Guido Imbens,
and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, argue that the quasi-experimental approach has led to a ‘credibility
revolution’ in empirical economics because it makes less demanding assumptions.3
Notable economists and philosophers, such as Angus Deaton, Nancy Cartwright, and James
Heckman, have argued that this quasi-experimental approach cannot be used for most policy
evaluation because its results lack external validity.4 Without external validity, the causal
1Compare (Robbins [1932]).
2For example, Card and Krueger ([1993], [2000]) find that a modest increase in New Jersey’s
minimum wage had either a small positive or no employment effect, while Neumark and
Wascher ([1995]) reach the opposite conclusion with different data.
3See, for instance, (Angrist and Pischke [2009]; [2010]; Imbens [2010], and Imbens and
Angrist [1994]).
4Compare (Deaton [2010]; Deaton and Cartwright [2017]; Heckman [2008]).
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effects estimated by a quasi-experiment could not be extrapolated beyond the observed
situation used for the estimation. This would severely limit the usefulness of the
quasi-experimental approach for policy evaluation because most policy decisions require
knowledge of the consequences of policies when applied to novel populations.
This paper will argue that this objection to the quasi-experimental approach is based on a
misconstrual of the approach as purely deductive, but that its usefulness is nonetheless
severely restricted by its innate reliance on the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA).5 It will conclude that the thus limited results of quasi-experiments may still be
useful as input for more traditional econometric models.
In section 2, the causal effect of a policy will be defined in counterfactual terms. This
definition entails two problems: an epistemological problem and a conceptual problem.
In section 3, the epistemological problem — also known as the fundamental problem of
causal inference — will motivate a short introduction to the traditional and quasi-experimental
approaches to causal estimation. Then the external validity objection to the
quasi-experimental approach will be examined. It will be argued that replication of
quasi-experimental estimates and consequent inductive reasoning can be used to endow the
results of quasi-experiments with external validity.
Section 4 will introduce the conceptual problem of causal estimation and show how it is
commonly dealt with by appeal to SUTVA. The quasi-experimental approach’s reliance on
SUTVA will be shown to be problematic due to the prevalence of social interaction effects in
economic policy evaluations. The stable marginal unit treatment value assumption
(SMUTVA) will be proposed as a more plausible alternative. This limited version will be
demonstrated to reduce the approach’s usefulness considerably. Moreover, it will be argued
that inductive reasoning provides no relief against this objection.
Section 5 concludes.
5An assumption developed in (Rubin [1978]; [1980]) and first named in (Rubin [1986]).
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2 Causal Effects in Econometrics
Both the proponents and critics of the quasi-experimental approach either explicitly or
implicitly use Rubin’s model of causal inference — a definition of causal effects in terms of
counterfactual outcomes.6 Let Xi be a binary random variable denoting whether individual i is
subject to the policy of interest or not. If individual i is subject to the policy, then Xi = 1, and,
otherwise, Xi = 0. Then define Yi,xi to be the outcome variable of individual i when the policy
variable Xi = xi. The causal effect of the policy on individual i’s outcome is consequently
defined as the individual treatment effect:
Yi,1 − Yi,0 (2.1)
For any individual i, either Xi = 1 or Xi = 0 is observed, but not both. Hence, either Yi,1 or Yi,0
is a counterfactual outcome. The causal effect of the policy on i is thus the difference between
the actual outcome and the counterfactual outcome which would have been observed if the
policy status of i had been different.
To illustrate, suppose a policymaker’s nation has expanded its military a decade ago and the
policymaker is now interested in the causal effect of this expansion on the civilian earnings of
the additional veterans. She may be interested in this for a variety of policy reasons. For
instance, if she thought military service might have had a negative effect on veterans’ civilian
earnings, she may desire to compensate them for the financial loss their service to her nation
has caused them. Alternatively, the policymaker may be interested in the long-run impact
which a future expansion would have on aggregate demand in her national economy. Either
way, the policymaker thus tries to find the causal effect which military service has had on the
civilian earnings of veterans.7
6The name of the model was coined by Holland ([1986]), as a label for a model developed in
(Rubin [1974], [1977], [1978], and [1980]). For work by proponents using this definition, see
(Angrist [1991], Imbens and Angrist [1994]; Angrist and Pischke [2009]). For a critic’s
explicit use of this definition, see (Heckman [2005]; [2008]).
7Strictly speaking, the policymaker would only be interested in the causal effect on the
additional veterans who just entered due to the expansion, see (Heckman [2008]; Heckman
and Urzua [2009]). For the purposes of this exposition, it is assumed that these two effects are
identical.
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Then, for each veteran, the causal effect, or individual treatment effect, of military service is
the difference between what they earned after they served and what they would have earned if
they had not served. If a veteran actually earned less than she would have earned without
serving, then military service has had a negative causal effect on her civilian earnings.
There are two obvious problem with this definition of the causal effect: an epistemological
problem and a conceptual problem. Conventionally, the epistemological problem receives
more attention in the literature and will be discussed in the following section. The conceptual
problem will be introduced in section 4 and it will motivate the development of this paper’s
objection to the use of quasi-experiments for causal estimation.
3 The Epistemological Problem
The epistemological problem — also known as the fundamental problem of causal inference
— is that, if the causal effect is defined counterfactually, knowledge of the counterfactual
outcome Yi,0 is necessary to determine the causal effect. But, by definition, this counterfactual
outcome cannot be measured.
In other fields, such as medicine, randomized controlled trials (RCT) are standardly
employed to address this problem by estimating counterfactual outcomes. RCTs estimate
counterfactual outcomes by comparing the average outcome of those who received the
treatment E[Yi,1] with the average outcome of those who did not receive the treatment E[Y j,0]:
E[Yi,1] − E[Y j,0] (3.1)
Given large enough sample sizes and that the individuals have been assigned their treatment
status randomly, it can then be assumed that the group of the treated I = {i : Xi = 1} and
untreated group J = { j : X j = 0} are, on average, equal to each other with respect to everything
other than their treatment status. Given the stable unit treatment assumption (SUTVA), the
average counterfactual outcome E[Yi∈I,0] is then equal to the observed average outcome
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E[Y j∈J,0] and, so, from equation 3.1:8
E[Yi,1] − E[Yi,0]. (3.2)
By the mathematical properties of the expectation operator, the above is an unbiased
estimator of the so-called mean treatment effect (MTE):
E[Yi,1 − Yi,0]. (3.3)
Although this is not the individual treatment effect, the MTE — the average of the individual
treatment effects — is nonetheless an important causal effect in the evaluation of policy.9
Randomization thus offers an avenue to estimating the average causal effect of a policy.
However, despite some noteworthy exceptions in behavioural and development economics,
economists have to mostly rely on non-randomized observational data. This is a problem
because, without randomized assignment, the treated i ∈ I and the untreated j ∈ J may differ
with regard to so-called confounding factors. A confounding factor — or confounder — is a
variable Ci which directly influences both the policy status Xi and the outcome variable Yi. If
such a confounder is present, any covariation of Xi and Yi might be partly or entirely due to Ci
— obscuring any causal effect Xi might have on Yi.
For instance, Jackson et al ([2012]) suggests that the personality traits of those who choose
to serve in the military may, on average, be different from the personality traits of those who
do not serve. Moreover, these same personality traits are argued by Judge et al ([1999]) to
have effects on career success. Therefore, even if military service had no causal effect on
civilian earnings, the average civilian earnings E[Yi∈I,0] may have been different from the
average earnings E[Y j∈J,0] of non-veterans because veterans and non-veterans differ in
personality traits which affect their earnings. E[Y j∈J,0] can hence not be used as an unbiased
estimator for E[Yi∈I,0].
Economic policy is commonly assigned according to factors which also have an influence
8SUTVA will be discussed in more detail in section 3.
9This is accepted by critics such as Deaton ([2010]), but the MTE’s usefulness is scrutinized
by Heckman ([2008]).
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on the outcome variable or people self-assign themselves according to such properties, like in
the above example. Confounders are therefore normally present in economic observational
data.
To overcome the problem of confounders in their data, econometricians have developed a
plethora of statistical methods for estimating counterfactual outcomes. How these methods are
best applied has, however, been a matter of controversy.
3.1 The structural approach
Traditionally, economists have approached this epistemological problem by building
‘structural models’ — that is, systems of equations — which, informed by economic theory,
model the present causal mechanisms.10 Such models yield an estimate Ŷi,0 of the
counterfactual outcome Yi,0. The individual treatment effect is then estimated by:
Yi,1 − Ŷi,0. (3.4)
However, this ‘structural’ approach faces considerable criticism because economic models
are unlikely to capture all relevant causal channels as many aspects of individuals’ choice
behaviour are not captured by economic data.
For example, Judge et al. ([1999]) provide evidence that some personality traits are linked
to career success. Although this is not conclusive evidence that these personality traits have a
significant causal effect on civilian earnings, it certainly seems plausible to hypothesize that
such a causal channel exists.
However, if an economic model were used to estimate the counterfactual civilian earnings
of the veteran υ, υ’s personality traits would typically not be included because such
psychological data is often not collected at large scales. Similarly, there will be many other
factors which would have significantly affected υ’s counterfactual civilian earnings but are not
measured. Therefore, unless these factors can be accurately estimated themselves, they are not
10Note that econometric models are not only built to estimate the causal effect of changes in
individual policies, but also to facilitate a multidimensional understanding of the causal
interactions within a system and the magnitude of these interactions, see (Heckman [2008]).
However, such features are not the subject of this paper’s discussion.
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included in these economic models.
Given such omissions, it seems unlikely that the estimate Ŷi,0 is an accurate reflection of the
true counterfactual outcome Yi,0. If Ŷi,0 is not an accurate reflection of the true counterfactual
outcome Yi,0, the estimated causal effect will not measure the true causal effect.
3.2 The quasi-experimental approach
Due to the above difficulties with building explicit models of all relevant causal factors, the
proponents of the quasi-experimental approach argue for the use of statistical methods which
require less extensive models. These range from instrumental variable estimation over
difference-in-differences to regression discontinuity designs and propensity score matching.11
What these ‘quasi-experimental’ estimation methods have in common is that they draw
inspiration from randomized experiments.
Quasi-experimental methods overcome the problem of confounders in observational data by
using mostly informal economic reasoning to discern and compare subsets I∗ ⊆ I of the treated
and J∗ ⊆ J of the untreated which are, on average, the same with regard to all confounders:
E[Yi∗,0] = E[Y j∗,0], where i∗ ∈ I∗, j∗ ∈ J∗. (3.5)
The causal effect on people in these subsets can then be estimated by comparing their
means:
E[Yi∗,1] − E[Y j∗,0], where i∗ ∈ I∗, j∗ ∈ J∗. (3.6)
If I∗ = I, this estimates the MTE. If I∗ ⊂ I, this is the causal effect on those individuals in
the subsets which the quasi-experimental method has discerned. This causal effect will
subsequently be referred to as the generalized local average treatment effect (GLATE).12 It is
11See (Angrist [1990]) for an example of instrumental variable estimation, (Card and Krueger
[1993]) for difference-in-differences, (Angrist and Lavy [1999]) for regression discontinuity
design and (Jackson et al. [2012]) for propensity score matching.
12The local average treatment effect (LATE) is a treatment effect estimate specific to
instrumental variable estimation, first introduced in (Imbens and Angrist [1994]). LATE is
‘local’ or dependent on the choice of instrumental variable because different instruments
affect different subpopulations. While other quasi-experimental methods, such as the ones
mentioned above, require other formal assumptions, they also discern an average effect
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important to note that none of the above requires the members of each subset i∗ ∈ I∗, j∗ ∈ J∗ to
be known. Rather, all that is needed is a good argument for why the subsets should be
equivalent with regard to all confounders (see equation 3.5) and the ability to determine the
observed mean outcomes for each subset (see equation 3.6).
To illustrate, Angrist ([1990]) uses an instrumental variable design to estimate the effect of
military service in the Vietnam War on civilian earnings of American veterans in the early
1980s. In the early 1970s, young men born between 1950 and 1953 were conscripted using
draft lotteries. For these draft lotteries, every day of the year was randomly assigned a
Random Selection Number (RSN) from 1 to 365 and all 19- and 20-year-old men who were
born on days with RSNs below a certain threshold number were eligible to be drafted.13 Given
a certain set of informally justified assumptions, the average effect of conscription on those
who only served because of the lottery can be estimated because the confounding properties of
this subset of the drafted is, on average, the same as those who were not draft-eligible and did
not serve.14
3.3 The external validity objection
Heckman ([2008]), Heckman and Urzua ([2009]), Deaton ([2010]), Deaton and Cartwright
([2017]) argue that the above quasi-experimental approach is of little interest to policy
evaluation because it cannot be used to address many important policy evaluation problems.
This is justified by the approach’s alleged exclusive focus on ‘narrow’ local average treatment
effects.
To this end, the critics of the approach contend that knowledge of the causal effect on
specific subsets of the population is not sufficient for addressing many policy evaluation
problems. Further, they hold that extrapolation from the local average treatment estimates of
quasi-experiments to ‘broader’ causal effects for larger populations is not possible because the
‘local’ to the discerned subpopulations I∗ and J∗. Thus, GLATE is an informal generalisation
of LATE from IV estimation to the underlying quasi-experimental approach.
13The RSN lottery was only the first step in the conscription process and was followed by
additional screening steps, like physical examinations.
14See (Imbens and Angrist [1994]) for the required assumptions in the case of instrumental
variable estimation.
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approach lacks ‘external validity’. Therefore, the critics conclude that the quasi-experimental
approach cannot be used to address policy evaluation problems which concern more than
small, quasi-experimentally discernible subpopulations.
3.3.1 ‘Narrow’ and ‘broad’ causal effects
In the previous section, it has been shown that quasi-experimental methods generally only
estimate the GLATE. Although it is theoretically possible for quasi-experiments to estimate
the MTE, this is unlikely in practice as it would require the quasi-experimental discerning of a
subset of the untreated J∗ ⊆ J which is on average equal to the whole population of the treated
I = I∗. The GLATE is a ‘narrow’ causal effect because it is not the causal effect of the policy
on every possible individual but only the effect the policy had on those treated individuals
i∗ ∈ I∗ who were discerned by the applied quasi-experimental method. Without extrapolation,
the GLATE can therefore only be used in the evaluation of a policy’s effects on the discerned
subset of the population I∗.
For example, Angrist ([1990]) provides the causal effect of the involuntary military service
on ‘reluctant’ conscripts, that is, on those conscripts who would not have served without the
draft lottery. On its own, this causal effect has little implications for the evaluation of any
realistic policy because, in practice, it is very difficult to distinguish between ‘reluctant’ and
‘willing’ conscripts. Moreover, even if we were able to make the distinction between
‘reluctant’ and ‘willing’, (Angrist [1990])’s estimate would only be of interest if policymakers
wanted to design a compensation scheme for ‘reluctant’ veterans of the Vietnam War.
Like in this example, these ‘narrow’ effects of a policy may address a small subset of the
relevant policy evaluation problems, but, oftentimes, they will not shed light on the policy’s
effects on larger subpopulations. For instance, (Angrist [1990])’s estimate is not the effect of
conscription on Vietnam conscripts as a whole because (Angrist [1990])’s instrumental
variable estimation does not consider the outcomes of ‘willing’ conscripts. Even if the latter
group’s outcomes happened to be numerically identical to the outcomes of the ‘reluctant’
conscripts and, thus, they happened to make (Angrist [1990])’s estimate numerically correct
for all conscripts, this would be a mere ‘accident of the numbers’ (Cartwright and Munro
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[2010], p. 261).
Therefore, on its own, the estimate can neither be used to evaluate the causal effect of
conscription in the Vietnam War on the civilian earnings of conscripts nor can it evaluate the
causal effect of military service on the civilian earnings of all Vietnam veterans. Yet both
these causal effects would be important if policymakers wanted to adequately compensate all
conscripts or all veterans for their service to their country. These effects would also be
relevant if policymakers wanted to evaluate the long-run effect which conscription has had on
aggregate demand, compared to voluntary military service.
Moreover, without further assumptions, these ‘narrow’ effects only allow for the
retrospective evaluation of policies because these effects describe the consequences of an
already implemented policy on a specific subpopulation I∗.15 Here, too, although the
quasi-experimental approach evaluation of implemented policies can be useful, the evaluation
of prospective policies is also important. It is important to be able to adequately compensate
the conscripts of the Vietnam War in hindsight but it would be even better if the policymakers
knew the causal effect of conscription on the civilian earnings of prospective conscripts before
a new war starts. Unless the latter is known, the design of future conscription compensation
schemes is void of empirical evidence until after the conscripts’ post-war civilian incomes are
measured.
3.3.2 Extrapolation and external validity
The results of quasi-experiments are only limited in the above way, if additional assumptions
cannot be used to extrapolate the ‘narrow’ results to the ‘broader’ population. However, in
many cases, such extrapolation seems natural. Indeed, Angrist ([1990]) does just this and
claims to have ‘measured the long-term consequences of military service during the Vietnam
era’ (Angrist [1990], p. 313) — that is, of all military service.
The implicit assumption here seems to be that, if conscription had an effect on civilian
earnings, then this must have been exclusively due to it involving military service and,
therefore, any effect which conscripts have suffered will have, on average, been suffered in the
15Compare (Heckman [2008])’s three problems of policy evaluation. For a more accessible
summary of (Heckman [2008])’s discussion, see (Reiss [2015], p. 378.)
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same way by voluntary servicemen. In other words, the ‘narrow’ effect on ‘reluctant’
conscripts is extrapolated to the whole population based on the assumption that, on average,
all sufficiently large subsets of the population are impacted the same way by military service.
This assumption that all sufficiently large subpopulations are on average affected equally by a
policy will here be called the assumption of causal homogeneity.16 Formally, this can be
expressed as the average causal effect on an individual in the quasi-experimentally discerned
subpopulation κ∗ ∈ I∗ ∪ J∗ being equal to the average causal effect on an individual in a
non-discerned subpopulation γ ∈ C, where C ⊆ {I ∪ J} \ {I∗ ∪ J∗}:
E[Yκ∗,1 − Yκ∗,0] = E[Yγ,1 − Yγ,0] (3.7)
Note that this causal homogeneity does not require that the expected outcomes E[Yi,xi] need to
be equal within or across subpopulations I∗ ∪ J∗ and C. Rather, the assumption is a statement
about the true average causal effect of the policy on different subpopulations. As stated above,
in the case of (Angrist [1990]), this is the assumption that military service had the same causal
effect on the ‘reluctant’ conscripts, which are discerned by the instrumental variable, as it had
on those who would have volunteered for military service anyway.
Cartwright ([2007]) argues that this assumption is not supported by quasi-experiments
themselves because they are so-called ‘clinchers’.17 ‘Clinchers’ are deductive estimation
methods for causal effects. The truth of these methods’ estimates is guaranteed ‘if they [the
‘clinchers’] are correctly applied and their assumptions are met’ (Cartwright [2007], p. 12).
16The condition that the subpopulations be ‘sufficiently large’ is necessary to distinguish this
assumption from the untenable assumption that every individual is affected identically.
Subpopulations are thus ‘sufficiently large’ when the averages of their outcomes no longer
reflect idiosyncratic differences between individuals.
17Cartwright ([2007]) never explicitly states this because her discussion focuses on
randomized controlled trials (RCT). However, she mentions that this label also applies to
‘certain econometric methods’ (Cartwright [2007], p. 12) and Deaton ([2010]) and Deaton
and Cartwright ([2017]) criticize both RCTs and instrumental variable estimation in this
way. Furthermore, it can be shown that the results of RCTs can be interpreted as
instrumental variable estimations with randomization as instrument, see (Heckman [1995]).
For an independent argument for instrumental variable estimation being a ‘clincher’ method,
see (Reiss [2007], pp. 126–145). In this paper, this criticism is generalized to all
quasi-experimental methods.
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In (Angrist [1990]), these assumptions are the informally justified assumptions which allow
the application of the draft lottery as an instrumental variable. As long as these assumptions
are sufficiently well justified to believe their truth, one is also justified to believe the
instrumental variable estimate to be true. However, given that the assumptions’ justifications
only apply to the subpopulations I∗ and J∗, these assumptions may not hold for other
subpopulations and, for these, the same causal inference cannot be made.
Further, the discerned subpopulations I∗ and J∗ are often not only equal with respect to all
confounders, but they also intuitively seem more similar to each other than to other
subpopulations in other ways. This provides prima facie evidence for potential causal
heterogeneity between the discerned I∗ and J∗ and other subpopulations. To illustrate, in
(Angrist [1990]), it seems intuitively plausible that conscription could have a different effect
on the ‘reluctant’ conscripts than on those conscripts who would have been interested in
serving voluntarily because of, for example, their personality traits. Hypothetically,
involuntary military service could have additional psychological effects which may then have
a greater impact on ‘reluctant’ conscripts’ prospects in the labour market.
Thus, in the absence of support for the homogeneity assumption and the presence of such
intuitions for causal heterogeneity, the results of quasi-experiments cannot be extrapolated to
other subpopulations or other populations. Put differently, the estimates lack external validity.
Without such external validity, the quasi-experimental approach remains restricted to ‘narrow’
effects and cannot be applied to the evaluation of policies with ‘broad’ effects or
unimplemented policy options.
3.4 Replication and induction
What this external validity objection fails to consider is that quasi-experiments can and are
used to support assumptions of causal homogeneity. While it is true that a single
quasi-experiment is insufficient to justify such assumptions, a multitude of consistent
quasi-experimental results may provide ampliative evidence for causal homogeneity across the
whole population. Even though the differences across subpopulations may still be seen as
prima facie evidence for causal heterogeneity, quasi-experiments can provide sufficient
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evidence to establish defeasible, but strong support for causal homogeneity assumptions. In
the context of medical RCTs, this response to the objection has been developed by Backmann
([2017]); Angrist and Pischke ([2010], pp. 22–5) outline a similar argument in less detail.
If a number M of quasi-experimental methods are used to estimate the causal effect of a
policy, then they measure the policy’s effect for a series of pairs of subpopulations I∗k and J
∗
k ,
each corresponding to a quasi-experiment k. Even if the estimates for all these subpopulations
are very similar, the average causal effect for the whole population cannot be deductively
inferred from the results of the quasi-experiments, unless the union of these subpopulations⋃M
k=1{I∗k ∪ J∗k } is equal to the whole population I. As long as there remains a subpopulation for
which the effect of the policy has not been estimated, it is still possible for this remaining
subpopulation to be impacted differently by the policy. Put differently, unless
⋃M
k=1 J
∗
k = I, the
similarity of the quasi-experimental results could still be a mere coincidence, not due to causal
homogeneity across the population.
However, each successful replication of a causal estimate for a different subpopulation
offers some inductive evidence that some assumption of causal homogeneity is justified. Each
such replication gives more support to the conclusion that the causal effect does probably not
only hold for the discerned subpopulation, I∗k and J
∗
k . For this purpose, different replications
may offer support for other homogeneity assumptions. For instance, on the one hand, Angrist
and Krueger ([1994]) show that conscription in World War II had a similar negative effect on
conscripts’ earnings as in (Angrist [1990]). Similarly, Imbens and van der Klaauw ([1995])
establish the same result for conscription in the Netherlands. Given that these papers all
concern themselves with conscription but vary with regard to the country and time period,
their congruent results offer some support for the homogeneity assumption that the average
causal effect of conscription is negative across countries and across time. This would allow for
extrapolation of the quasi-experimental result to future cases of conscription and, thus,
overcomes the external validity objection, including Heckman ([2008])’s criticism that
quasi-experiments can only evaluate retrospectively.
On the other hand, Angrist ([1998]) estimates the effect of voluntary military service
quasi-experimentally and finds a moderately positive impact. This undermines any
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assumption about the causal homogeneity between conscription and voluntary military
service. Furthermore, Angrist ([1998]) employs three different quasi-experimental designs,
each discerning different subpopulations, which makes it more likely that this positive causal
effect of voluntary military service is shared by most or all subpopulations of the population in
question. Similarly, Angrist et al ([2010]) use multiple quasi-experimental estimation methods
to explicitly address ‘concerns about the external validity of IV estimates’ (Angrist et al
[2010], p. 776).
It is true that, unlike the ‘narrow’ estimates on which they are based, these more applicable
inductive extrapolations are not indefeasible, even if all the made assumptions are true.
However, Cartwright, Deaton and Heckman are wrong to assume that this sacrifice of
indefeasibility undermines the advantage which quasi-experiments have over traditional
econometric models.
In section 2.3, it has been argued that the main advantage which quasi- experiments have
over structural models is that the former do not rely on comprehensive models of whole causal
systems. This is an advantage because such explicit models are unlikely to capture all causally
relevant factors because some of these factors, like personality traits, will likely be
unobserved. Because structural models rely on observed data, the causally relevant
unobserved variables are either ignored or modelled using observed variables. If they are
ignored, the model will only estimate the correct MTE by accident, if the effects of
unobserved confounders happen to cancel each other out. If the relevant unobserved variables
are modelled using observed variables, these models will be based on economic or
behavioural theories.
Whether one believes such models to be more or less credible than quasi- experiments
depends on one’s trust in the ability of economists to comprehensively list all confounding
factors and their theories’ ability to accurately model each unobserved confounding factor
using the available data.18 A comprehensive list of confounding factors is unlikely to be
achieved. But, even if this is ignored, current economic theory is often based on intuition and
simplifying assumptions which are either not justified by empirical data or outright refuted by
18Even the proponents of the quasi-experimental approach admit this, see (Angrist and Pischke
[2010], p. 22).
15
it. For instance, much of economics relies on expected utility theory whose assumptions have
been widely criticized, even by prominent economists.19 While the assumptions which allow
the extrapolation of ‘narrow’ quasi-experimental estimates are based on defeasible inductive
inferences, these inferences are at least built on deductively inferred ‘narrow’ causal estimates
for subpopulations. Provided the ‘narrow’ estimates have been replicated, these extrapolations
may therefore still be more credible than the ‘broad’ theory-based estimates of the traditional
approach.
Therefore, replication and inductive inferences offer the quasi-experimental approach a path
to overcome concerns about the external validity of its estimates. However, the next section
will argue that there is a more fundamental concern related to the conceptual problem and
SUTVA.
4 The Conceptual Problem
The conceptual problem arises in the definition of the counterfactual outcome Yi,0. So far,
counterfactual outcomes have only been defined as the outcomes which would occur if a
treated individual i was not subjected to the policy.20 The conceptual problem is that this
definition does not yield a unique counterfactual value because there are many vastly
dissimilar counterfactual scenarios in which i remains untreated.
To illustrate, there are counterfactual scenarios (‘A-scenarios’) in which veteran υ did not
serve because the expansion of the military has never been implemented. Alternatively, there
are many different counterfactual scenarios (‘B-scenarios’) in which the expansion occurred
but υ did not join, for reasons unique to υ.
To represent these differences formally, it is necessary to expand the notation by defining
the outcomes with respect to possible worlds — or hypotheticals — ωk ∈ Ω, where Ω is the set
of all possible worlds. Let ωa be the actual world. Consequently, counterfactual worlds are
defined as worlds ωk for all k , a. The outcome of individual i in world ωh will be written as
Yh
i,xhi
and i’s policy status will be Xhi = x
h
i .
19See, for example, (Rabin and Thaler [2001]).
20In the following, the focus will, for simplicity, be on those individuals who were actually
subjected to the policy — that is, the treated. In the above example, this is the veteran υ.
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The two sets of counterfactual outcomes for υ can then be expressed as follows:
‘A-scenario’ outcomes = {Ykυ,0 : k , a and Xki = 0 for ∀i}
‘B-scenario’ outcomes = {Ykυ,0 : k , a and Xki = 1 for ∀i s.t. Xai = 1 and i , υ}
However, the definition of the individual treatment effect requires that a choice be made
between these different counterfactual outcomes because the effect is only uniquely
determined with a unique value for the counterfactual outcome Yki,0.
Thus, the conceptual problem necessitates a more substantial definition of the hypothetical
which yields Yki,0.
4.1 Counterfactual interventions and SUTVA
One such definition can be obtained by appeal to counterfactual ‘interventions’.21 Following
the interventionist framework of causation, the Rubin’s model of causal inferences can be
extended thus:
Instead of simply defining the causal effect in terms of the counterfactual outcome after a
change of policy status of one individual xi, it will be defined in terms of the outcome which
would have occurred if there had been an exogenous intervention which changed the policy
status of any number of individuals.22
Formally, let n ∈ N be the number of individuals in the population and define the ‘policy
assignment’ Ph in world ωh as the n-dimensional vector of all individuals’ policy statuses xhi :
Ph = (xh1, x
h
2, ..., x
h
n−1, x
h
n) (4.1)
With this notation, the causal effect from equation 3.1 can be restated as the difference
21A different solution would be the use of Lewis’ framework of counterfactual causation, see
(Lewis [1973]; [1979]). Indeed, Heckman ([2008]) references this approach. However, the
problem with this framework is that it introduces the concept of ‘closeness’ between
hypotheticals but fails to provide a measure of this ‘closeness’, see (Heckman [2008], p. 9).
22This paper limits itself to the elements of the interventionist framework of causation which
are required for the purposes of this discussion. For a general and in-depth treatment, the
reader is referred to (Pearl [2009]) or (Woodward [1997]). Alternatively, for a more succinct
but still insightful introduction, see (Hitchcock 2001).
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between the average outcomes Yi given the actual ‘policy assignment’ Pa, where Xai = 1, and
under the counterfactual ‘policy assignment’ Pk, where Xki = 0:
E[Yi | Pa] − E[Yi | Pk], where Xai = 1 and Xki = 0. (4.2)
The causal effect of the policy is thus not simply the effect of the policy as it was actually
assigned. As noted by Holland ([1986]), ‘the effect of a cause is always relative to another
cause’ (Holland [1986], p. 946) and, in this case, the other cause is the baseline of a
counterfactual policy assignment Pk. In other words, the effect of the policy is the causal
effect of the change from a hypothetical policy assignment Pk to the actual policy assignment
Pa. In the parlance of the interventionist framework of causation, the causal effect of Rubin’s
model thus completes the consequent of the interventionist counterfactual ‘If Pk was changed
to Pa, then Yi would change by . . .’.
Further, the counterfactual ‘policy assignment’ Pk is not simply the ‘policy assignment’
which would have actually occurred if policymakers had not enacted the policy. Rather, which
counterfactual ‘policy assignment’ Pk is the right baseline depends on the policy evaluation
question at hand.
To illustrate, if a policymaker wanted to compensate a veteran υ for the financial losses their
service status has caused them individually, then the appropriate counterfactual ‘policy
assignment’ would be one under which veteran υ did not serve but the military expansion still
took place, that is the ‘policy assignment’ PB of ‘B-scenarios’. On the other hand, if the
evaluation question asked for the impact of these financial losses on aggregate demand
because the policymaker wanted to estimate the effect on aggregate demand of a future
military expansion, then the actual ‘policy assignment’ would be contrasted with a ‘policy
assignment’ under which the military expansion had not taken place, that is the ‘policy
assignment’ PA of ‘A-scenarios’.
The above examples illustrate how the same policy, in this case the military expansion, can
have different effects depending on which counterfactual ‘policy assignment’ Pk it is
contrasted with. And this is more than a mere interpretative difference — the magnitude and
size of the causal effect may be contingent on this choice of counterfactual ‘policy
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assignment’ Pk.
This is due to social interaction effects, such as general equilibrium effects. Social
interaction effects are the changes in individual i’s outcome Yhi,xi which are indirectly caused
by the treatment statuses Xhj of other individuals via the behavioural changes caused by these
other individuals’ treatment statuses.
For instance, the counterfactual outcomes of veteran υ in ‘A-scenarios’ and ‘B-scenarios’
may differ considerably. In ‘A-scenarios’, υ may have needed to compete with more young
people for civilian jobs than she would have in ‘B-scenarios’, because, without the military
expansion, more young people would remain on the civilian job market. This increased
competition could mean that, on average, υ remains unemployed for longer in ‘A-scenarios’
than υ in ‘B-scenarios’ in which there is less competition on the civilian labour market. If this
was the case, then, ceteris paribus, υ’s civilian earnings under the ‘A-scenario’ assignment PA
would be lower than her counterfactual income under the ‘B-scenario’ assignment PB.
Consequently, the causal effect of the service status would be more positive or less negative
when using PA as the baseline of comparison, rather than PB, because the actual earnings Yaυ
would be compared to the lower ‘A-scenario’ earnings.
Although more than this informal labour market story would be required to determine
whether the social interaction effects are, in aggregate, positive or negative in this case, it is
clear that the estimated causal effect depends on the choice of policy question and, thus, of
counterfactual intervention.
In the econometric literature, this conceptual problem is only rarely explicitly discussed.23
If social interaction effects are mentioned, the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) is commonly invoked to assume away such effects.24 This assumption postulates
that, across hypotheticals, the outcome of any individual Yi is invariant to changes in the
treatment values of other individuals X j across hypotheticals. Using the present notation, this
23For example, (Angrist [1991]; Imbens and Angrist [1994]; Angrist and Pischke [2009]) do
not mention general equilibrium effects or other types of social interactions.
24SUTVA was first named in (Rubin [1986]). For statistical literature on SUTVA, see (Rubin
[1978], [1980]; Holland [1986]). For econometric literature which expresses a cautious
stance on the assumption, see (Heckman [2005], assumption (A-1), p. 11, [2008]; Heckman
and Smith [1998], assumption A-1, p. 12; Imbens [2010], p. 401, [2014], footnote 3; Athey
and Imbens [2017], p. 19–23).
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can be expressed formally as:
Yhi,xi = Y
l
i,xi for any ω
h, ωl which differ only by
n−1⋃
j,i
{Xhj = 1} ,
n−1⋃
j,i
{Xlj = 1}. (4.3)
In the remainder of this paper, this assumption will be argued to be implausible and that this
poses a severe problem to the quasi-experimental approach.
4.2 The social interaction objection
Like randomized controlled trials, quasi-experiments are based on the assumption that the
observed average outcome E[Yaj∗,0] of the untreated is equal to the counterfactual average
outcome E[Yki∗,0] of the treated if the treated had not been treated. It has been shown above that
it is not clear in terms of which counterfactual scenario ωk — and, thus, ‘policy assignment’
Pk — the average counterfactual outcome E[Yki∗,0] is defined and that the appropriate definition
of the counterfactual intervention depends on the exact policy question which is to be
answered. Further, a different definition of the counterfactual ‘intervention’ could lead to
different estimates because of general equilibrium effects and other social interaction effects.
In the following sections of this paper, it will be argued that SUTVA, which is standardly
invoked to avoid clearly defining a counterfactual, is implausible in the presence of social
interaction effects. The novel stable marginal unit treatment assumption (SMUTVA) will be
proposed as the foundation of a more plausible interpretation of quasi-experimental estimates
in the presence of social interaction effects. However, adoption of SMUTVA will be shown to
severely limit the type of policy evaluation questions which quasi-experiments can address. In
analogy to section 3.4, an inductive attempt to overcome these restrictions will be considered.
Finally, the conclusion will be that the applicability of quasi-experiments as a standalone
approach to causal estimation remains severely limited, although an auxiliary role in
economic policy evaluation remains a possibility.
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4.2.1 From SUTVA to SMUTVA
For the evaluation of many types of interventions, SUTVA is a sensible assumption. In the
case of most medical treatments, it is reasonable to assume that the health outcomes of any
individual receiving a treatment will not be affected by the number of other people who
receive the same treatment. This is the case because, for most health outcomes, the only
significant causal mechanisms are those which directly affect the individual who receives the
treatment, such as the bio-mechanical mechanisms of pharmaceuticals. The effect of other
individuals’ health outcomes are mostly negligible.
One exception might intuitively be vaccines for contagious diseases. To illustrate, imagine
an experimental vaccine which reduces by 50% the chance of severe symptoms and contagion
if infected by a specific virus, but does not completely eliminate the risk. In this case, if a
sufficiently high proportion of the population within a certain region receives the vaccine, this
will have a significant impact on the health outcome of any individual receiving the vaccine
because the higher the number of vaccinated individuals the lower the risk of any individual
being infected.
Unless it can be ensured that all individuals face the same risk of being infected, the health
outcomes of any vaccinated individual could thus be affected by the number of other subjects
receiving the vaccine.25 In this case, SUTVA is no longer reasonable because it assumes away
just this social effect of the number of treated people.
By the same reasoning, SUTVA is rarely realistic for the evaluation of economic or social
policy. Economic and other social outcomes are typically affected by the number of treated via
social interaction effects because economic outcomes are, by their nature, the result of social
interactions between economic agents. A change in the behaviour of the members of a
sufficiently large subpopulation will typically have a non-negligible effect on the behavioural
responses and outcomes of the other participants in these social interactions.
For instance, conscription during the Vietnam War may have decreased the supply of young
25In practice, randomized controlled trials for vaccines are often designed to equalize the risk
of infection across treatment and control groups. This is achieved by controlled infection of
all subjects. For a review of such trials for influenza vaccines, see (Balasingam and
Wilder-Smith [2016]). As described in section 3, this extent of control over a policy’s
subject is not common in economics or other social sciences.
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men in the US economy, thus increasing the chances for non-conscripts to gain civilian work
experience during the war. Alternatively, in developmental economics, the provision of
income support by an nongovernmental organisation in one village may cause the local
government to divert resources to other towns, causing a so-called spillover effect.26 Similarly,
in education, the reduction of class sizes in some schools may reduce the number of good
teachers available to other schools in the area. This could diminish the quality of teachers at
the remaining schools and, hence, their educational outcomes.27
Therefore, unless the evaluated policy only concerns a minuscule or completely isolated
subpopulation, the observed average outcome of those who are actually untreated E[Yaj∗,0]
cannot be assumed equal to the counterfactual average outcome E[Yki∗,0 | Xki = 0 for ∀i ∈ I]
which the treated would have experienced if no one had been treated.
This is not a problem for the structural approach because this approach does not directly
equate an observed outcome with a counterfactual outcome. Instead, the observed outcome is
only an input into a model which yields the counterfactual outcome. The model can be
adjusted to account for interaction effects, such as general equilibrium or spillover effects.
However, the quasi-experimental approach directly equates an observed outcome E[Yaj∗,0]
with a counterfactual outcome E[Yki∗,0 | Xki = 0 for ∀i ∈ I]. This is problematic because the
observed outcome is influenced by social interactions effects which would not have been
present in the hypothetical ωk which yields the relevant counterfactual outcome.
The solution to this problem is to replace SUTVA with a more plausible assumption which
only allows for equating observed and counterfactual outcomes if both are influenced by
sufficiently similar social interaction effects. In most circumstances, this is reasonable if two
scenarios only differ with regard to a small subpopulation’s or individual’s treatment status
because most markets in which the economic outcomes are determined can be assumed to be
large enough for differences in the behaviour of a marginal number of participants to have a
negligible effect on the market’s outcomes.
To illustrate, the observed average outcome of the untreated E[Yaj∗,0] can reasonably be
26For concerns about spillover effects in developmental economics, see (Rodrik [2009], p. 19;
Ravallion [2009], p. 53).
27See (Sims [2010], pp. 65–7).
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assumed to be equal to the counterfactual average outcome
E[Yki∗,0 | Xki∗ = 0 and Xki = 1 for ∀i ∈ I∗, where i , i∗] which the treated would have
experienced if they had remained untreated in small groups or as individuals while the policy
was implemented for everyone else. In the example of the military expansion, this would be
the assumption that in ‘B-scenarios’ — that is, if any individual veteran or any small group
had not served but the military expansion had still occurred — the veterans would have, on
average, earned the same as what actual non-veterans earned. This is a sensible assumption as
long as the regional civilian labour markets are large enough for such a change in the number
of participants to not matter.
This assumption will be called the stable marginal unit treatment value assumption
(SMUTVA) and can be expressed as follows:
Yhi,xi = Y
l
i,xi for any two worlds ω
h, ωl which at most differ by (4.4)
⋃
j,i
{Xhj = 1} ,
⋃
j,i
{Xlj = 1} for a small enough  ∈ N.
Here the size of  depends on the number and size of participants in the markets in which the
relevant outcome Y is determined.
4.2.2 The implications of SMUTVA
However, based on SMUTVA, the quasi-experiment’s estimate of the causal effect from
equation 3.6 becomes the policy’s direct or marginal causal effect:
E[Yai∗,1] − E[Yki∗,0 | Xki∗ = 0, Xki = 1 for ∀i ∈ I∗, where i , i∗] (4.5)
This more restrictive definition has practical implications which are similarly limiting to the
approach as a lack of external validity objection would have been. Defined in this way, the
causal effect only allows for the economic evaluation of small policies which affect so few
people that they do not cause social interaction effects. This excludes most interesting policy
evaluation problems, such as most of the examples in this paper. For large-scale policies,
quasi-experiments can be used to estimate the direct effect of the policy on the marginal
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individual or small group. Such estimates could then be used as input into structural
econometric models, but are not sufficient to evaluate large-scale policies.28
For example, Angrist [1990]’s estimate needs to be interpreted as the effect of conscription
on veteran υ, given that conscription was implemented for everyone else. On the basis of this
marginal estimate, a compensation scheme could be designed if the intention of this scheme
was to compensate conscripts only for being drafted, and not for the introduction of
conscription. Hypothetically, if the social interaction effects of conscription on non-conscripts
were in aggregate positive, such a compensation scheme would compensate the conscripts by
less than a scheme which also compensated for the introduction of conscription. This is
because if the conscripts had not been drafted, their counterfactual civilian earnings as a
non-conscript would have been increased by the social interaction effects. However, if a
country’s policymakers were contemplating whether or not to introduce conscription and there
were concerns about the long-term impact of such a policy on aggregate demand, (Angrist
[1990])’s estimate could not be directly used to address these concerns.
If the goal is to evaluate more than the effect of minuscule policies or of the addition of
individuals to a large policy’s population of subjects, the inclusion of social interaction effects
in causal estimation is crucial. The quasi-experimental approach is unable to do so on its own
because it is based on the comparison of observed outcomes which, at least partially, are
themselves affected by these social interaction effects.29
4.3 Induction again?
Although both this argument and the external validity objection conclude that the applicability
of the quasi-experimental approach is restricted to relatively unappealing policy evaluation
problems, the response from section 3 does not transfer to this section. Replication and
consequent induction are not a feasible response to the social interaction objection.
28For an econometric model which attempts to supplement treatment effect estimator by a
simple general equilibrium model, see (Heckman and Smith [1998]).
29In principle, quasi-experimental estimates could be adjusted by social interaction effects
either through formal models, such as noted above, or by informal argument. Note, however,
that informal arguments are highly unlikely to establish the exact sign and size of non-zero
aggregate social interaction effects because of the variety of interactions involved.
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The difference between these two objections is that, while the external validity objection
contends that quasi-experiments’ ‘narrow effects’ cannot be extrapolated, the conceptual
problem which the indirect social interaction objection is based on reveals that, even for the
discerned subpopulations I∗ and J∗, quasi-experiments fail to estimate the overall causal effect
of the policy. Instead, their estimates’ validity are themselves limited to marginal effects.
This is unsurprising if we recall that replication and induction were meant to support causal
homogeneity assumptions, such as equation 3.7. While the truth of such assumptions would
overcome the external validity objection, it is obvious that such assumptions do not help
against the social interaction objection. The latter objection would hold even if the average
causal effect of a policy were the same for every significant subset of the population because
such homogeneity would not alter the omission of any potential social interaction effect from
quasi-experimental estimation methods.30
In other words, replication and induction cannot overcome the social interaction objection
because all quasi-experimental replications are identically ignorant of social interaction
effects. Unlike in section 3.4, replication cannot provide inductive evidence about social
interaction effects because quasi-experimental replications of the original estimate in different
populations cannot reflect variations in social interaction effects.
For example, if a policy was implemented at a small enough scale to assume that no
significant social interaction effects are present, a quasi-experiment’s estimate of the marginal
effect of the policy may be assumed to be equal to the overall effect in this setting. Even if this
estimate is replicated by a quasi-experiment on a larger-scaled version of the same policy, this
does not show that the overall effect is the same but only that the marginal effect is constant.
All that is established by such scale-invariant effect sizes is the scale invariance of the policy’s
marginal effect.
30Once again, ‘significant’ here is meant to indicate that considered subpopulations need to be
large enough to ‘average out’ idiosyncratic differences in the causal effects on individuals.
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5 Conclusion
To summarize, the quasi-experimental approach can be used to evaluate the economic
consequences of small-scaled policies with negligible social interaction effects. For such
policies, quasi-experiments cannot only estimate the causal effects of an implemented policy
on a small subpopulation, but also provide support for the inductive extrapolation of these
estimates to implementations of the same small-scaled policy in other populations. Thus, such
inductive extrapolation extends the approach’s applicability beyond the retrospective
evaluation of policies.
Yet, for policies whose social interaction effects are non-negligible, quasi-experiments’
usefulness is limited. Given SMUTVA, they can only be plausibly used to estimate the direct
causal effects of such policies on marginal subjects. By itself, the quasi-experimental
approach cannot estimate the overall economic effects of large-scale policies, such as
conscription’s effect on aggregate demand or minimum wage increases’ effect on
employment. In the evaluation of such large-scale policies, quasi-experiments could still be
used as input for more traditional econometric models, whose theoretical assumptions allow
the estimation of social interaction effects.
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